Simulation innovation in Naval Special Warfare by utilizing small working groups by Rainville, Thomas A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-03
Simulation innovation in Naval Special Warfare by
utilizing small working groups
Rainville, Thomas A.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10809
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
STIMULATING INNOVATION IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
BY UTILIZING SMALL WORKING GROUPS 
by 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
20010328 050 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 
0188 
OMB No. 0704- 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 
March, 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: 
Stimulating Innovation in Naval Special Warfare by Utilizing Small Working 
Groups 
6. AUTHOR(S)   Rainville, Thomas A. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000  
i. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
Naval Special Warfare has produced successful innovation by using small working groups. Naval Special Warfare deems 
an innovation successful if it results in a more efficient, less risky, more cost effective method to conduct special operations. 
The Quantum Leap program is an example of successful innovation in Naval Special Warfare produced by a small working 
group. How have these small groups been able to produce successful innovations? Michael McCaskey's Theory offers an 
explanation of how small working groups innovate. His theory is a generally accepted theory on how to produce innovation in 
the business world by using small working groups. McCaskey identified three variables needed to produce innovation: 1) the 
small working group must have the support and protection of the leadership, 2) have access to resources, and 3) have autonomy 
from established structure within an organization. After interviews with senior Naval Special Warfare officers, two additional 
variables were deemed important. Ownership and the license to fail were added to McCaskey's three variables. 
This thesis will test which variables were or were not present during three Naval Special Warfare case studies where small 
working groups attempted to produce innovation. Two of the case studies successfully produced innovation, but the final case 
study failed to produce an innovation. This thesis will evaluate the five variables in each case study and attempt to explain why 
the innovation was a success or a failure. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
15. Innovation, small working groups, Quantum Leap, MKV SOC, Vision 2000 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES      9 2 
















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
STIMULATING INNOVATION IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
BY UTILIZING SMALL WORKING GROUPS 
Thomas A. Rainville, 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.A., Norwich University, 1990 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER QE SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2001 
Author: \'j LrHfo Q ■   KL£-S^_ 
Thomas A. Rainville 
Approved by: '72&£&7fijlkesi 
David Tucker, Thesis Advisor 
yJ&=A 
usan Hoceyar, Second Reader 
fij 
/ Gordon McCormick, Chairman 
Special Operations Academic Group 
in 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
Naval Special Warfare has produced successful innovation by using small working groups. 
Naval Special Warfare deems an innovation successful if it results in a more efficient, less risky, 
more cost effective method to conduct special operations. The Quantum Leap program is an 
example of successful innovation in Naval Special Warfare produced by a small working group. 
How have these small groups been able to produce successful innovations? Michael 
McCaskey's Theory offers an explanation of how small working groups innovate. His theory is 
a generally accepted theory on how to produce innovation in the business world by using small 
working groups. McCaskey identified three variables needed to produce innovation: 1) the small 
working group must have the support and protection of the leadership, 2) have access to 
resources, and 3) have autonomy from established structure within an organization. After 
interviews with senior Naval Special Warfare officers, two additional variables were deemed 
important. Ownership and the license to fail were added to McCaskey's three variables. 
This thesis will test which variables were or were not present during three Naval Special 
Warfare case studies where small working groups attempted to produce innovation. Two of the 
case studies successfully produced innovation, but the final case study failed to produce an 
innovation. This thesis will evaluate the five variables in each case study and attempt to explain 
why the innovation was a success or a failure. 
THIS^PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
A. BACKGROUND 1 
B. DEFINING INNOVATION AND SMALL WORKING GROUPS 3 
C. DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE AT INNOVATION 4 
D. SCOPE 6 
II. FIVE KEY VARIABLES FOR SMALL WORKING GROUPS 9 
A. INTRODUCTION 9 
B. VARIABLES 11 
C. METHODOLOGY 22 
III. QUANTUM LEAP CASE STUDY 27 
A. BACKGROUND 27 
B. VARIABLES 31 
C. SUMMARY 37 
IV. MKV SOC CASE STUDY 41 
A. BACKGROUND 41 
B. VARIABLES 44 
C. SUMMARY 50 
V. VISION 2000 CASE STUDY 53 
A. BACKGROUND 53 
B. VARIABLES 58 
C. SUMMARY    64 
VI. CONCLUSION 67 
A. FINDINGS 67 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 70 
LIST OF REFERENCES 73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 75 
Vll 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vni 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Quantum Leap Varibles 39 
Table 2. Quantum Leap/MKV SOC Variables 51 
Table 3. Quantum Leap/MKV SOC/Vision 2000 Variables 64 
IX 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author wishes to thank Professors David Tucker and Susan Hocevar for their efforts, 
guidance and patience throughout this work. 
XI 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Xll 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with 
organizations that do not change-and USSOCOM is no 
exception.  Guided by a comprehensive, enduring 
vision and supporting goals, we must constantly 
reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful 
members of the joint team.  USSOCOM must embrace and 
institutionalize the process of change  (General 
Peter J. Schoomaker, Special Operations Forces: The 
Way Ahead, p. 6). 
A. BACKGROUND 
Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is a component 
command of the United States Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM).  NSWC is a bureaucracy within the larger United 
States military bureaucracy.  Stephen Peter Rosen, 
summarizing a commonly held view writes, "Almost everything 
we know in theory about large bureaucracies suggests not 
only that they are hard to change, but that they are 
designed not to change.  Military bureaucracies, moreover, 
are especially resistant to change." (Rosen, 1991, p. 2) 
SOCOM has given its component commanders clear direction to 
innovate to remain relevant in the 21st Century.  Given that 
NSWC is a military bureaucracy, innovation is a very 
difficult task and extremely challenging to implement. 
James Q. Wilson, author of Bureaucracy,   states, 
"We ought not be surprised that 
organizations resist innovation.  They are 
supposed to resist it.  The reason an 
organization is created is in large part to 
replace the uncertain expectations and haphazard 
activities of voluntary endeavors with the 
stability and routine of organized relationships. 
The standard operating procedure (SOP) is not the 
enemy of organizations, it is the essence of 
organization.  Stability and routine are 
especially important in government agencies where 
demands for equity are easily enforced." (Wilson, 
1989, p. 221) 
Given the constraints of inflexibility and resistance to 
innovation, how do organizations within military 
bureaucracies innovate, remain relevant and successfully 
complete future missions? 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) believes that small 
working groups are an effective tool to overcome 
bureaucracies' resistance to innovation.  The senior SEAL 
officers, interviewed by the author, were members of small 
working groups attempting to stimulate innovation.  They 
believe small working groups break down barriers and 
roadblocks to innovation created by military bureaucracies. 
NSW has successfully utilized small working groups to 
stimulate innovation.  This thesis will ask the following 
questions: What makes small working groups effective at 
stimulating innovation?  Why do they work? 
B. DEFINING INNOVATION AND SMALL WORKING GROUPS 
Innovation within the military can take many forms - 
doctrinal, strategic, tactical, technological, and 
material.  The definition of innovation for the purposes of 
this thesis is the introduction of something new or 
different that improves the operational capabilities of 
SEAL platoons or Special Boat detachments to conduct 
successful Naval Special Warfare missions. 
Small working groups, as defined by this thesis, are a 
small group of people (normally less than ten) who come 
together to stimulate innovation within a larger, 
bureaucratic organization.  The small working group may be 
a permanent group or it may disband after meeting its 
objectives. 
Why would a military bureaucracy need to utilize small 
working groups to stimulate innovation?  Lipman-Blumen and 
Leavitt, co-authors of Hot Groups,   believe that successful, 
long-lived organizations are fast becoming very rare.  They 
state, "To cope with environmental turbulence, 
organizations are trying to become much more nimble, 
innovative and continuously self-modifying.  They are also 
much more willing to combine, subdivide, form alliances, 
absorb pieces of one another and spin off pieces of 
themselves.  [Small working groups,] temporary and deft, 
are a perfect fit for such volatile conditions." (Lipman- 
Blumen and Leavitt, 1999, p. 74)  In today's fast-paced 
environments, small working groups help organizations cut 
through red tape and excessive barriers to produce 
innovation. 
C. DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE AT INNOVATION 
Previously in this chapter, innovation was defined as 
the introduction of something new or different that 
improves the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons and 
Special Boat detachments to conduct successful Naval 
Special Warfare missions.  This definition will be utilized 
throughout this thesis as the basic definition of a 
successful innovation.  A successful innovation must 
improve operational capabilities, and be recognized, 
accepted, implemented, and utilized by the Naval Special 
Warfare Community.  Identifying an innovation that improves 
operational capabilities is only the first step toward a 
successful innovation.  The most difficult step is getting 
the innovation recognized, accepted, implemented and 
utilized within the NSW Community.  "In the organizational 
world... the right answer is not likely to be the whole 
answer.  The rest has to do with getting other parts of the 
organization and the world to believe, accept and use your 
group's earth-shaking breakthrough.  Failing that, your 
great output could - as so many have - quickly sink into 
the sea of the forgotten and forgone." (Lipman-Blumen and 
Leavitt, 1999, pp. 105-106)  Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt have 
identified the importance of properly implementing an 
innovation. 
An innovation that fails can be defined as a good idea 
that would have improved the operational capabilities of 
Naval Special Warfare, but it was not implemented.  An 
example of this emerged during one of the case studies 
presented in this thesis (Vision 2000), where NSW senior 
leadership supported the innovation, received good reviews, 
but was not implemented.  This failure may happen at any 
step of the process of innovation such as during the 
concept phase, development, testing and evaluation phase or 
during the implementation phase.  A great innovative idea 
that would improve operational capabilities can easy fail 
during the implementation phase.  The NSW Community may not 
recognize the innovation; the innovation may be recognized, 
but not be utilized by the NSW Community because, for 
example, it is too costly to implement.  If the NSW does 
not recognize the importance of the innovation, then it is 
doomed to fail. 
D.  SCOPE 
This thesis will examine three cases where NSW 
utilized small working groups to produce innovation.  The 
NSW community" has approximately 2,500 military personnel. 
It is a relatively small organization when compared to 
other communities within the military or large 
corporations, but it is a military bureaucracy.  This 
thesis will provide specific details on how a bureaucratic 
organization can utilize small working groups to produce 
innovations.  I have identified five variables that will be 
tested in this thesis to identify their relevance to 
producing innovation by small working groups.  Three 
variables, support and guidance of the leadership, 
resources and funding, and autonomy, have been taken from 
Framework for Analyzing Work Groups,   by Michael B. McCaskey 
(1979).  The McCaskey article provides relevant definitions 
and examples of three common variables that will be tested 
and examined during this thesis.  It provides a study on 
how small working groups produce innovation within a larger 
bureaucracy.  This case study is used in the business 
world, but is relevant for Naval Special Warfare because 
the case study suggests how bureaucracies can utilize small 
working groups to stimulate innovation. 
Stephen P. Rosen and James Q. Wilson support the 
McCaskey variables.  For example, Rosen writes, "The study 
of peacetime military innovation showed that when military 
leaders could attract young officers with great potential 
for promotion to a new way of war, and then were able to 
protect and promote them, they were able to produce new, 
usable military capabilities."  (Rosen, 1991, p. 252) 
Rosen emphasizes the importance of senior leadership's 
guidance and support when attempting to produce innovation. 
James Q. Wilson writes, "Innovation—requires an exercise of 
judgment, personal skill...." (Wilson, 1989, p.232)  Wilson 
also believes that leaders must possess the adequate skills 
and vision to stimulate innovation. 
I conducted interviews with senior SEAL officers who 
also support McCaskey's variables.  Two additional 
variables, ownership and license to fail, were suggested by 
these senior NSW officers, who had experience with small, 
innovative working groups in NSW, as being important for 
producing innovation.  The five variables will be explained 
in detail in Chapter two. 
The thesis will examine three cases of innovation 
using small working groups; two cases produced innovation 
and one case failed to produce innovation.  This thesis 
will look for the presence or absence of the five variables 
in the case studies to determine which are relevant for 
innovation. 
Chapter two will define the five variables and how 
they will be measured.  Chapters three, four and five 
present the Naval Special Warfare case studies.   Chapter 
six reports my findings and recommendations. 
II.   FIVE KEY VARIABLES FOR SMALL WORKING GROUPS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Michael B. McCaskey (1979) wrote, "Framework for 
Analyzing Work Groups" as a case study to be used for 
classroom discussion at the Harvard Business School.  The 
three variables from the McCaskey article are support and 
guidance of the leadership, resources and funding, and 
autonomy.  His case study of the Merit Corporation has 
excellent examples of the positive effects when the 
variables are present within a parent organization as a 
small working group is attempting to stimulate innovation. 
The study also shows the negative effects on innovation 
when the variables disappear as the small working group is 
trying to stimulate innovation.  These three variables were 
presented to several senior SEAL officers for validation 
and feedback.  They all agreed that the McCaskey variables 
are relevant when attempting to stimulate innovation.  A 
senior NSW officer who produced innovations with small 
working groups believes that two additional variables must 
be considered: ownership and the license to fail. 
The Merit Corporation is a fictitious corporation 
based on an American corporation.  "The Merit Corporation 
was a medium-sized firm that manufactured and sold 
children's furniture nationally.  From its inception the 
company had been family owned and operated, and John 
Kirschner was now the President of Merit."(McCaskey, 1979, 
p.2)  Merit held a dominant market share in the children's 
furniture market, but the field was becoming increasingly 
competitive.  Kirschner, who was approaching retirement 
age, was concerned with Merit's problem with developing new 
products.  Kirschner decided to create a small working 
group to help develop new products and stimulate innovation 
within the Merit Corporation.  The small working group 
consisted of seven members with one team leader. 
Under Kirschner, the small working group enjoyed the 
support and guidance of the leadership, access to resources 
and funding, and autonomy.  The group had three offices co- 
located on the fourth floor of an office building away from 
all the other Merit offices located on the second floor. 
Within six months the small working group had developed a 
variety of innovative and unique product ideas.  After one 
year, the group developed a new product that within six 
months captured a 20% share of an extremely competitive 
market.  The product was widely acclaimed for its low 
manufacturing cost, durability and consumer appeal. 
After Kirschner retired, Joe Donaldson was brought in 
as the new Merit President.  Donaldson immediately began to 
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question the small working group, as no new products were 
imminent.  He moved the group down to the main offices and 
assigned the members of the group different offices not co- 
located with each other as they had been on the fourth 
floor.  The group was encouraged to work routine hours and 
dress in traditional business attire.  These changes began 
to create adverse tensions and the group lost its creative 
edge and ceased to produce new product innovations.  The 
small working group was eventually disbanded and its 
personnel reassigned to different divisions.  Some 
voluntarily left the company. 
Under Kirschner, the small working group at Merit 
produced new product innovations and was ultimately a 
success; whereas, under Donaldson, the group was stifled, 
disbanded and ended in failure.  McCaskey points out 
several variables that are necessary for innovation to 
occur and gives examples of positive outcomes when the 
variables are present within a large organization. 
B.  VARIABLES 
Five variables have been identified that should be 
present in order for small working groups to stimulate 
innovation within a larger, bureaucratic organization. 
Three variables are taken from McCaskey's article.  These 
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variables are support and guidance from the leadership, 
resources and funding, and autonomy.  The two additional 
variables, ownership and the license to fail were provided 
by a senior NSW officer who produced innovations with small 
working groups.  All five variables will be tested in three 
Naval Special Warfare case studies to determine if they 
were present when innovation was successful or when it 
failed. 
1.  Support and Guidance of the Leadership 
Support and guidance of the leadership can be defined 
as the senior leadership, often the actual commander of a 
particular unit, endorsing and supervising the small 
working group in its efforts to stimulate innovation and 
advocating its work.  "Teams [small working groups] need 
the visible support of top management... So in the most 
successful organizations, [The leadership] meets regularly 
with the teams to see how they are coming, show their 
interest, and to learn from the teams." (Glenn, 1991, p. 
20)  The leadership needs to be actively involved and 
interested in the small working group's activities.  They 
must ensure the group receives the appropriate level of 
priority within the larger organization so the group may 
12 
overcome barriers and roadblocks that may impede progress 
and innovation. 
Admiral William Moffett, who was responsible for the 
development of carrier aviation as separate striking force 
acting independently from battleships prior to World War 
II, provides an example of the importance of leadership. 
"He did this... by intervening in the promotion process to 
ensure that a lot of aviators rose in rank." (Wilson, 1989, 
p. 22 6)  Admiral Moffett kept the carrier aviation 
innovation alive by protecting aviators and getting them 
promoted which helped to ensure the innovation would be 
fully implemented.  The aviation community had the support 
and guidance of the leadership. 
The small working group in McCaskey's case study was 
given a high priority by the company president.  "Kirschner 
personally recruited and selected the eight members of the 
group into the organization, thus making it clear to the 
rest of the organization that this is a special project, 
high on his list of priorities." (McCaskey, 1979, p. 5) 
The support and guidance provided by Kirschner is exactly 
what a small working group needs to flourish and become 
productive.  He made it perfectly clear to the rest of the 
organization that the small working group would receive his 
support and guidance to help produce new product 
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innovations.  Kirschner provided a high level of support 
and guidance to the small working group. 
This study will look for indicators that support and 
guidance of the leadership was provided to the small, 
innovative working groups and will attempt to establish 
whether or not each group received the support and guidance 
of the leadership it required to accomplish its task. 
Several questions must be answered to determine if the 
small working group enjoyed the support and guidance of the 
leadership.  Did the leadership select the personnel to 
make up the small working group?  In McCaskey's case study, 
Kirschner, the company president, personally selected 
members for the small working group.  What was the chain of 
command?  Was the small working group under the direct 
supervision of the top leader, or did it report to a lower 
ranking leader?  The small working group at the Merit 
Corporation reported directly to the company president and 
did not report to anyone else at the company.  Did the 
group have a direct line of communication with the top 
leadership?  In the Merit case, the group enjoyed a direct 
line of communication with the company president with no 
interference from the rest of the organization.  Another 
important test of whether the group had the support and 
guidance of the leadership was whether the leadership 
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provides a vision with an end state along with clearly 
defined tasks and goals?  In the Merit Corporation, 
Kirschner clearly explained that he wanted improved product 
development and that the small working group was created to 
stimulate new product innovations. 
2.  Resources and Funding 
The small working group needs the support and guidance 
of the leadership, but it also needs resources and funding. 
The resources and funding variable can be defined as the 
small working group having access to the resources 
(personnel and time) and funding necessary to accomplish 
its mission, task or goal.  Admiral Moffett used his 
personnel and their time to acquire the funding to get 
contracts for high-speed carriers approved and kept the 
innovative carrier strike force alive and well.  Without 
these resources, the carrier aviation innovation may have 
failed. 
The small working group at Merit was given a budget 
sufficient to design and build prototypes of innovative 
children's furniture.  Without the proper resources and 
funding made available from the larger organization, the 
group could not have properly functioned and would 
certainly not have accomplished its objectives.  Stephen 
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Rosen does not believe that funding is important when 
trying to produce innovation.  He believes that talented 
military personnel and time are important.  He states that, 
"Rather than money, talented military personnel, time and 
information have been the key resources for innovation." 
(Rosen, 1991, p. 252)  The senior NSW leadership disagrees 
with Rosen.  They believe that funding is very important 
when attempting to stimulate innovation. 
The resources and funding available to the small 
working group must be evaluated to determine if the group 
was provided sufficient resources to successfully complete 
its tasks.  Several questions must be answered to determine 
if the small working group was provided the resources and 
funding by the larger organization.  Was the small working 
group staffed with enough personnel?  Did they possess the 
required skills to complete the necessary tasks?  The small 
working group at Merit was adequately staffed with eight 
full time employees whose only job was to produce 
innovative new products.  They were not assigned to any 
other divisions or given collateral duties.  Was the small 
working group given the time required to complete its 
tasks?  The group was given the proper amount of time to 
focus on new product development at Merit.  The group 
produced its first innovative product months before 
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scheduled.  Was the group given the amount of funding to 
successfully complete its tasks?  Kirschner provided the 
group with a budget and used it for designing and building 
new innovative products. 
3 . Autonomy- 
Autonomy can be defined as the small working group 
being an independent and self-directing group within the 
larger organization.  In 1933, the newly created Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) of the Marine Corps had organizational 
autonomy as its members were left alone to write training 
manuals, conduct exercises, design equipment and establish 
doctrine for amphibious warfare.  The officers of the FMF 
were given autonomy by the leadership to develop innovative 
tactics on amphibious warfare.  An autonomous group is one 
that is given very few organizational procedures to follow 
and very little formal structure that would constrain the 
group's behavior and innovative processes.  As an example 
of this, McCaskey noted, "Because he wants to foster 
innovation, Kirschner has taken special pains to shield the 
[small working] group from most of the structure and 
procedures that apply to the rest of the organization." 
(McCaskey, 1979, p. 5) Kirschner only required a progress 
report every other week and a monthly financial report from 
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the group.  This is a fine example of the corporate 
president giving the maximum autonomy to his small working 
group in order for the group to work towards its maximum 
potential. 
Several questions must be answered to indicate whether 
the small working group was given the proper amount of 
autonomy to complete its tasks.  Was the group subject to 
the same procedures that governed the rest of the 
organization? Who did the group work for and report to? 
How often did the group have to report its progress?  What 
were the group members doing on a day-to-day basis and did 
it matter to the leadership of the organization?  What 
normal rules and regulations was the group exempted from? 
What were some of the critical decisions of the leadership 
to show that the group had autonomy?  In the Merit 
Corporation, the small working group was exempted from many 
of the procedures and guidelines that the rest of the 
organization had to follow.  The group worked for the 
company president and only had to report to him every other 
week. 
4.  Ownership 
The final two variables, ownership and the license to 
fail, were deemed important by senior NSW leadership. 
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There are three types of ownership.  The leadership, small 
working groups and the NSW community can take ownership of 
an innovation.  Although the leadership and the small 
working group at the Merit Corporation took ownership of 
the innovative project, the organization did not.  The 
small working group took autonomy to an extreme of 
isolation, which contributed to the failure of ongoing 
innovation when a new leader (Donaldson) replaced 
Kirschner.  In order to properly implement an innovation, 
the small working group must ensure that the leadership has 
ownership of the new innovation.  The leadership can be 
said to take ownership of an innovation when it understands 
the innovation, recognizes its value, and assists its 
implementation.  An indicator that the NSW leadership has 
taken ownership of an innovation is when the importance of 
the innovation is recognized and the leadership takes 
active steps to carry out the innovation.  Another 
indicator of an organization taking ownership of an 
innovation is when great efforts are taken to write 
manuals, conduct exercises and establish doctrine to 
validate an innovation. 
An example of this is the establishment of the Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) in the Marine Corps in 1933.  The 
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establishment of the FMF may have been the most important 
advance in the history of the Marine Corps. 
"The practical result was for the first time, a 
permanent organization for the study and practice 
of amphibious warfare was created...  [General 
John] Russell, [Commandant of the Marine Corps] 
directed that the Marine Corps Schools devote 
themselves exclusively to preparing a manual to 
train officers in the new methods of amphibious 
assault." (Rosen, 1991, p. 83) 
The Marine Corps had taken ownership of the Fleet Marine 
Force innovation. 
"[The small working group] must form the alliances, 
build the relationships and make the connections that will 
cause your groups output to be implemented." (Lipman-Blumen 
and Leavitt, 1999, pp. 105-106)  Lipman-- Blumen and Leavitt 
state that the organization must have xbuy-in' to the 
innovation produced by the small working group.  The group 
must brief the rest of the organization and show how the 
innovation will enhance the organization's ability to 
function more efficiently.  All of the key personnel 
briefed needed to have ownership of the project for it to 
be implemented and utilized. 
In order for an innovation to be implemented, the 
organization must recognize the importance of the 
innovation and take ownership of it.  Several questions 
must be answered to prove that the small working group was 
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successful at ensuring the whole organization would take 
ownership of their innovation.  Once briefed, did the key 
leaders in the community understand the innovation, 
recognize its value, and help push it through the 
implementation process?  Were training manuals written, 
exercises conducted and doctrine established to validate 
the innovation?  The organization needs to recognize the 
importance of the innovation and take ownership of it. 
5.  License to Fail 
A second issue that was mentioned by senior NSW 
leadership was the "license to fail".  The small working 
group must be issued a "license to fail" by the larger 
organi zat ion. 
"[The leadership] must convince their 
[subordinates] that if they join the innovative 
efforts of a (usually) short-term executive, 
their careers will not be blighted if the 
innovation fails or the executive departs before 
it is implemented.  Admiral Moffett did this in 
the Navy; so did Commandant Russell in the Marine 
Corps..."  (Wilson, 198 9, p. 231) 
License to fail exists when failing to meet an innovation 
goal does not have an adverse affect on the individual's 
military promotion.  The leadership recognizes that in 
order to produce successful innovation, the group must be 
given a great amount of the latitude to stumble, fall down, 
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fail and pick itself back up and move forward again.  The 
group's operations and path to stimulating innovation will 
not be flawless, but a series of mistakes, roadblocks, and 
possible failures.  The license to fail gives the group 
permission to experiment and think far beyond 
organizational norms.  Under this charter, the small 
working group will not be afraid to try radical ideas and 
innovations to solve its problems and meet its objectives. 
Several questions must be answered to prove that the 
small working group was given the license to fail by the 
leadership.  Was any member of the group in fear of being 
passed over for a military promotion if the group failed to 
produce an innovation?  Due to a failure, was the group in 
jeopardy of being dissolved?  Could the group fail without 
fear of retribution from the leadership or the rest of the 
organization?  What was the leadership's response/actions 
when failure occurred? 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
I interviewed Captain William McRaven and Frank 
Clarke, who were members of the Quantum Leap small working 
group, at NSWG-1 in Coronado, CA.  I interviewed CAPT 
McRaven for one hour and Frank Clarke for three hours.  I 
conducted a one and a half hour telephone conversation with 
Dale Freeman, who was a member of the MKV SOC small working 
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group, at USSOCOM located in Tampa, FL. I interviewed CAPT 
Pete Toennies (ret), who was the group leader of the Vision 
2 00 0 small working group, for two hours in San Diego, CA. 
Prior to the interviews, I created a standard list of 
questions to ask all of the members of the small working 
groups.  The following is a list of the questions asked: 
1.  Support and Guidance of the Leadership 
1. Did the leadership select the personnel to make up the 
small working group? 
2. What was the chain of command? 
3. Was the small working group under the direct 
supervision of the top leader, or did they report to a 
lower ranking leader? 
4. Did the group have a direct line of communication with 
the top leadership? 
5. Did the leadership provide vision along with clearly 
defined tasks and goals? 
2.  Resources and Funding 
1. Was the small working group staffed with the number of 
personnel with the required skills to complete the 
assigned tasks? 
2. Was the small working group given the time required to 
complete their tasks? 
3. Was the group given the amount of funding to 
successfully complete their tasks? 
3.  Autonomy 
1.  Was the group subject to the same procedures that 
governed the rest of the organization?  Who does the 
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group work for and report to?  How often did the group 
have to report its progress? 
What are the group members doing on a day-to-day basis 
and does it matter to the leadership of the 
organization? 
What normal rules and regulations was the group 
exempted from? 
What were some of the critical decisions of the leader 
to show that the group had autonomy?  Specific 
examples. 
4. Ownership 
1. Once briefed, did the key leaders in the community 
accept the innovation and help push it through the 
implementation process? 
5. License to Fail 
1. Was any member of the group in fear of losing their job 
if the group failed to produce an innovation? 
2. Due to a failure, was the group in jeopardy of being 
dissolved? 
3. Was the group given the latitude to fail without fear 
of retribution from the leadership or rest of the 
organization? 
4. What was the leadership's response/actions when failure 
occurred? 
The people interviewed were asked the same exact questions 
to keep the case studies standard and consistent.  They 
also provided written materials to provide additional 
reference material.  Their answers along with the written 
material were analyzed and the case studies were created. 
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The five variables (Support and guidance of the 
leadership, resources and funding, autonomy, ownership and 
license to fail) have been presented and defined.  Chapters 
three, four and five are NSW case studies.  Each case study- 
is analyzed for evidence of the variables and to identify 
what their presence or absence suggests about small working 
groups stimulating innovation. 
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III.  QUANTUM LEAP CASE STUDY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (NSWG-1) is located at 
NAB Coronado in San Diego, CA and is commanded by a SEAL 
Captain (0-6)..  NSWG-1 is the next higher authority for all 
West Coast SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE in 
Hawaii and two overseas SEAL Units in Guam and Bahrain. 
The purpose of NSWG-1 is to, "Ensure NSWG-1 relevance in 
the 21st Century by maintaining a world class capability 
that is unorthodox in approach, dependable in execution and 
positively affects the Theater Commander's objective." 
(McRaven, NSWG-1, p. 8)  NSWG-1's vision is to provide the 
force of choice to clarify and simplify the battlefield, 
provide unorthodox solutions to complex military problems 
by leveraging advanced technology and to be recognized 
worldwide as dependable, highly disciplined and of 
uncompromising integrity. 
In July 1996 a small working group with three key 
personnel was informally established to develop the Quantum 
Leap concept to use Indirect Warfare as an innovative 
approach to accomplishing NSW tasks.  The key personnel 
were the group's leader, a SEAL Commander, then Chief Staff 
Officer, the second in command at NSWG-1.  A Federal Civil 
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Servant at NSWG-1 was the technical expert and provided . 
continuity for the project.  A Navy Lieutenant, who worked 
very closely with the civil servant, was the third member 
of the group. 
The Quantum Leap project began because new technology 
was forcing SEALs to change the way they conducted 
operations, threatening to make them irrelevant.  The 
accuracy of precision-guided munitions made the standard 
SEAL platoon Direct Action mission appear too risky to the 
Theater Commander.  Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) have the 
potential to both conduct reconnaissance missions against 
an enemy without risking human life and provide real-time 
intelligence to the military commander who needs it.  UAVs 
can now conduct reconnaissance missions deep into enemy 
territory, where prior to UAV development, military 
personnel would have had to infiltrate enemy controlled 
territory to conduct risky reconnaissance missions.  Night 
Vision Devices and thermal imagers are making it more 
difficult for personnel to infiltrate across the beach.  It 
was obvious to the leadership at NSWG-1 that Naval Special 
Warfare operators needed to change the way they conducted 
operations in order to remain relevant in the 21st Century. 
Project Quantum Leap was the first step in ensuring that 
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Naval Special Warfare forces remain relevant and dependable 
in the future. 
The major concept of the Quantum Leap project was the 
focus on Indirect Action.  The difference between Direct 
Action and Indirect Action missions is that during a 
traditional SEAL Direct Action mission SEALs would use 
surprise and superior firepower to destroy a heavily- 
defended target; whereas during an Indirect Action mission, 
SEALs accomplish the same task by destroying critical 
unprotected nodes.   In doing so, the risk associated with 
the mission is reduced, but the effect on the enemy remains 
the same. 
As an example, NSWG-1 has successfully completed 
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mock' attacks against real critical nodes located in the 
San Diego area.  The objective of the mission was to delay 
a naval vessel from getting underway for seventy-two hours. 
A traditional SEAL Direct Action mission would have been a 
combat swimmer attack against the naval vessel placing 
limpet mines on the hull of the ship.  This type of attack 
is very risky to the SEAL operator because it places him in 
a very vulnerable position while he executes the mission. 
Instead of attacking a naval warship in San Diego Harbor, 
Quantum Leap operators destroyed a critical fuel pumping 
station that supplies all fuel to the San Diego area.  By 
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destroying a secluded and unprotected pumping station, fuel 
was denied to NAS Miramar, San Diego Naval Station and the 
Point Loraa Submarine Base, thus delaying the target vessel 
from getting underway for at least seventy-two hours.  By 
completing this type of operation, the threat and risk to 
the operator was diminished while the effect on the enemy 
was the same. 
Quantum Leap leveraged advanced technology to improve 
operational capabilities.  During a fleet exercise 
conducted in 1997, Quantum Leap used secure real-time chat 
between five different Task Unit Commanders all located on 
different fleet ships and submarines taking part in the 
exercise.  The NSW Task Group Commander, located on the 
command ship, was in constant communications with his Task 
Unit Commanders.  The COTS communications led to improved 
information flow, operational updates and intelligence 
reporting.  Improved technology allowed the development of 
tracking boxes that could be carried by individual SEALs 
and tracked by fleet systems.  This would provide the 
operational commander instant verification of the location 
of the SEALs conducting the mission and provide situational 
awareness for the duration of the operation. 
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B. VARIABLES 
Having explained Quantum Leap, we can now determine 
how many of the variables we have identified" were or were 
not present during the Quantum Leap Project. 
1.  Support and Guidance of the Leadership 
The Quantum Leap small working group enjoyed the 
support and guidance of the leadership at NSWG-1.  The 
Commander, NSWG-1, personally selected the members of the 
original working group.  The three key group members were 
augmented with permanent and temporary personnel, as the 
group's leader deemed necessary to complete its goals. 
These personnel were drawn from NSWG-1 and its tenant 
commands and possessed the required expertise and skills to 
complete the Quantum Leap objectives.  As an example, the 
best-qualified enlisted SEAL operators were recruited to 
conduct "mock" attacks on real targets to display the 
effectiveness of the Quantum Leap efforts.  The small 
working group reported directly to the Commander, NSWG-1 
and did not report to another individual within the NSWG-1 
organization.  The small working group enjoyed a direct 
line of communication with the NSWG-1 Commander.  The 
31 
Commander would intervene when the group required 
additional help to solve major problems or issues.  He 
intervened to help the small working group find adequate 
office space at NSWG-1.  The group's leader had unlimited 
access to the Commander, who was personally committed to 
the success of the project.  The Commander provided the 
vision and he clearly defined the tasks and goals for the 
group.  The Commander understood how important the project 
was to the future relevancy and success of the NSW 
community.  He wanted the Quantum Leap small working group 
to produce innovative concepts, test and evaluate the 
concepts with practical exercises and report the successes, 
failures and recommendations.  With this information from 
the group, the Commander moved the project forward.  The 
Commander provided the vision and gave the group leader the 
responsibility with the authority to make changes and 
complete the objectives of the project. (Clarke, NSWG-1, 2 9 
Jun 2 000) 
2. Resources and Funding 
The small working group was given the resources and 
funding it required to complete its assigned tasks.  The 
group was provided $150,000.00 of discretionary funds for 
the first year of operation.  Although $150,000 may not 
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seem like a large amount of money, the people I interviewed 
agreed it was enough to get the program off and running. A 
majority of the money was spent on purchasing new equipment 
for the project.  Additional computer terminals, a complex 
tracking system, and tracking boxes were purchased. 
(Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 Jun 2 000)  The group was given the time 
required to complete its tasks without pressure to speed up 
the schedule.  It must be mentioned that during a change in 
leadership, the Quantum Leap Project temporarily lost 
funding, resources and direction under a new Commander. 
The project almost died.  The new Commander had to be 
convinced of the worthiness of the project before 
committing additional funding and resources to it.  The 
group leader convinced the new Commander of the value and 
importance of the project and he became a great supporter 
and patron of the project for the rest of his time in 
command.  (McRaven, NSWG-1, 30 Jun 2 000) 
3. Autonomy 
The Quantum Leap small working group was given 
autonomy from the larger organization to meet its 
objectives.  The Commander stated, "If you need help, let 
me know." (Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 Jun 2000) Otherwise, the 
Commander provided the endstate and instructed the group to 
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get there.  The Commander informed the group that they were 
free from the normal rules of NSWG-1 and allowed to use all 
available NSWG-1 staff to achieve the desired endstate. 
The Chief Staff Officer, as group leader, understood how to 
keep the project moving and ensured that the group was 
never micromanaged.  The group was free to task organize as 
it saw fit without outside interference from the rest of 
the organization.  The group set its own agenda and plan of 
action and milestones free from organizational pressure. 
The organization was actively involved and helped the group 
when they needed outside assistance.  NSWG-1 assisted in 
getting additional SEAL operators involved with the Quantum 
Leap project.  The leadership cared about the progress that 
the small working group was making and ordered the rest of 
the organization to provide help whenever requested.  The 
group purchased equipment and supplies whenever it was 
required.  During the initial phase of the project, the 
group was able to quickly purchase equipment, without the 
usual red tape, in order to get the project moving. 
(Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 June 2000) 
4.  Ownership 
In order for the innovations produced by Quantum 
Leap's small working group to be implemented, the NSW 
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leadership and community had to take ownership of the 
project.  In order for the NSW leadership and community to 
take ownership of an innovation they must understand it, 
identify its value, and assist during the implementation 
process.  The Commander, NSWG-1, who first started the 
project, had ownership of the project as it began under his 
guidance and direction.  An indication that the NSW 
leadership had taken ownership of the Quantum Leap project 
was that exercises were conducted with the primary task of 
validating the Quantum Leap innovation. 
An extremely difficult problem for military 
organizations trying to produce innovation is keeping the 
project alive and well during the frequent changes in 
leadership.  The Quantum Leap project nearly died when the 
next Commander was not involved with the project and did 
not understand it or recognize its value for several 
months.  Had the group leader failed to convince the new 
commander of the merit of the project, it might have ceased 
to exist and would have failed to produce innovation.  The 
new Commander eventually understood the Quantum Leap 
Project, recognized its value, and assisted in the 
implementation.  He took ownership of the project.  Once 
the Commander took ownership of the project, it was 
instantly revitalized by a new influx of resources and 
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funding.  The Commander took ownership and placed it higher 
on his list of priorities.  The NSW leadership took 
ownership of the project and provided talented and highly 
qualified personnel to take an active part in the Quantum 
Leap program.  This ensured that the leadership had 
ownership of the project and that the project had qualified 
personnel to successfully complete its tasks. (McRaven, 
NSWG-1, 30 June 2000) 
The Commander, NSWG-1, during a discussion about the 
importance of ownership needed from the NSW leadership for 
an innovation to take hold, stated, "The first thing we did 
was get the Commanding Officers and Command Master Chiefs 
onboard.  Then we briefed the staff here [NSWG-1] and then 
1 briefed the Admiral [CNSWC]." (McRaven, NSWG-1, June 30, 
2 000) All of the key personnel briefed needed to have 
ownership of the project for it to be implemented and 
utilized. Having the support of the admiral provides 
ownership at the highest level that will positively 
influence the entire NSW community and help stimulate 
successful innovation. 
5.  License to Fail 
The small working group was given a license to fail by 
the Commander of NSWG-1.  The Commander understood that in 
order to produce innovation, the road would be full of 
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stumbling, mistakes and failures.  The guidance provided by 
the leadership was to learn by making mistakes.  He 
believed that the small working group should make educated 
decisions to push innovation forward.  It would be 
impossible to push innovation forward without making 
mistakes along the way. (Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 June 2000) 
During interviews with two members of the small working 
group, they said that, no member of the group was in fear 
of losing a promotion if the group failed to produce an 
innovation.  The group could fail without fear of 
retribution from the leadership or the rest of the 
organization.  The Commander made it perfectly clear to the 
group leader that failure and mistakes would happen and 
that the group should learn from them.  It was also made 
clear to the NSWG-1 staff to give additional assistance to 
the project when it hit a barrier or roadblock. (McRaven, 
NSWG-1, 30 June 2000) 
C.  SUMMARY 
Project Quantum Leap successfully produced innovation 
by improving the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons 
to conduct NSW missions.  The Indirect Warfare innovation 
exposes SEALs to less risk while improving the chances of 
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successfully completing the mission.  The five key- 
variables were all present while the Quantum Leap small 
working group worked to produce innovation at NSWG-1. 
When the ownership variable was missing during the first 
several months after a leadership change, the project 
languished, lost direction and almost ended.  When the 
ownership variable was not present, it triggered negative 
reactions in the support and guidance of the leadership and 
the resources/funding variables.  This indicates how 
important it is for the Commander to take ownership of the 
project.   If he does not take ownership, the project is in 
serious jeopardy.  It is also important for the NSW 
community to have some ownership to facilitate support 
through leadership transitions.  This case study suggests 
that when one variable disappears, it can have a cascading 
effect on other variables and almost stop the project in 
its tracks. 
Quantum Leap is a success in itself by surviving 
three changes of command at NSWG-1 and producing 
innovation.  Many small working group projects die in the 
military when the leadership changes and the following 
Commander does not take ownership of the project.  The new 
Commander may not identify the value of the project and 
choose not to support it.  When this occurs, it is only a 
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matter of time before the project will fail.  It is crucial 
that the group leader has a strong character, be 
influential and respected by the NSW community, if the 
project is to survive the constant change of commands in 
the military.  The group leader must immediately show the 
value of his project to the new Commander so he will take 
ownership, lend support, guidance and resources to the 
proj ect.  The Quantum Leap case study shows that the 
critical point of the project occurred immediately 
following a change of command. 
Another related event that proves that Quantum Leap 
was successful at producing innovations is that new, 
innovative projects such as Project 21 and the Mission 
Support Center (MSC) have evolved producing new innovations 
from the original Quantum Leap Project.  The innovations 
produced and lessons learned from Quantum Leap have been 
incorporated into the concept, design and functions of the 
MSC.  The MSC is a building with all the necessary 
equipment and networking applications to support overseas 
operations from its location at NSWG-1 in San Diego.  The 
mission statement for the MSC is, "Collect, organize and 
disseminate mission essential information into a form 
specifically tailored to the Mission Commander's need in 
order to focus a larger percentage of the operator's 
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limited time on the execution phase of planning, gear 
preparation and rehearsals, thereby enhancing the 
probability of mission success."  (McRaven, NSWG-1, 2000) 
The MSC project cornerstones - distributive planning, 
network analysis, fusion, situational awareness, force 
reaction and enablers - are all concepts originally 
developed by Quantum Leap.  The MSC is now completed and 




Resources Autonomy Ownership License to 
Fail 
LDS NSW SWG 
Quantum 
Leap X X X X X X X 
Table 1.  Quantum Leap Variables 
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IV.  MKV SOC CASE STUDY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
During the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, NSW used 
patrol craft designed in the 1960s that were well beyond 
their usable service life.  The craft had documented design 
flaws that jeopardized personnel safety and mission 
effectiveness.  The Gulf War proved that NSW needed a new 
and improved medium range craft to meet its current and 
future mission requirements.  A small working group was 
formed at USSOCOM to develop a new patrol craft to replace 
the aging Patrol-Lights, Sea foxes and Patrol Boat- 
Riverines in the NSW inventory.  The goal of the small 
working group was to provide the best possible craft to the 
NSW community, meeting its requirements in the shortest 
time, and staying within budget limitations.  The Mark Five 
Special Operations Craft (MKV SOC) project would soon 
produce a new, innovative patrol craft whose design and 
performance would be second to none.  The small working 
group developed the MKV concept into a unique design, 
oversaw system integrations and construction, and evaluated 
the product during operational testing. 
The primary mission of the MKV SOC was to provide 
medium range insertion and extraction support for Special 
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Operations Forces (SOF) personnel in a low to medium threat 
coastal environment.  The secondary mission of the MKV SOC 
was coastal patrol and interdiction.  The operating system 
of a MKV SOC Detachment was designed as a C-5 deployable, 
road transportable combatant craft comprised of two craft, 
with two transporters and tractor-trailers.  A deployable 
support package that was made up of containerized support 
components and vehicles would accompany each detachment. 
Each detachment would have a Maintenance Support Team (MST) 
that would consist of two officers and sixteen enlisted 
whose job was to keep the MKV detachment operational and 
prepared to conduct NSW missions. 
Initially, the acquisition of the MKV SOC was going to 
be managed by the Commander, Naval Sea System Command 
(NAVSEA).  After determining that it would take NAVSEA 
seven years until the first craft would be operational, 
USSOCOM petitioned and won the right to execute the program 
in-house.  A SEAL Captain was chosen to be the first 
program manager of the MKV SOC project.  He was also the 
group leader for the MKV SOC small working group.  The 
Group Leader reported to the USSOCOM Program Executive 
Officer for Maritime and Rotary Wing Platforms (PEO M&R). 
The PEO M&R reported to the Special Operations Acquisition 
Executive (SOAE), a civilian SES who had milestone decision 
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authority for the MKV SOC program.  This meant, the SOAE's 
decisions were final and only the Commander-in-Chief, 
Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) had the authority to 
overturn the SOAE's decisions.  The group leader had a 
deputy and several support staff in the small working group 
such as a financial adviser and a contracting officer.  The 
MKV SOC small working group, which had overall 
responsibility for the project, had less than ten full time 
members.  He had various technical support teams made up 
primarily of contractors who were in charge of specific 
functions on the MKV SOC project such as weapons and 
engineering.. He also had Special Boat combat crewmen from 
both Special Boat Unit Twelve (SBU-12) located in San 
Diego, CA and SBU-2 0 located in Little Creek, VA who would 
make recommendations on improving the MKV SOC during the 
developmental and operational testing phases. 
The MKV SOC project produced a craft that met or 
exceeded the operational requirements of a medium range 
patrol craft.  The small working group also produced 
significant innovations such as compressing the acquisition 
timeline. 
"The truly impressive result of this 
streamlining strategy was that, in the case of 
the MKV SOC acquisition, from February 1992, the 
date the program was officially chartered, to 
delivery of the first two production MKV SOC 
43 
systems took only 4 0 months, almost four years 
ahead of the initial program execution 
estimates." (USCINCSOC, 1998, p. 3) 
B.  VARIABLES 
1.  Support and Guidance of the Leadership 
The MKV SOC small working group enjoyed the support 
and guidance of the leadership. .As USSOCOM took the 
project from NAVSEA and it was USSOCOM's first in-house 
acquisition of a major platform, CINCSOC had to ensure that 
the project was a success.  He understood the importance 
and future implications that the project would have for the 
USSOCOM acquisition process.  The MKV SOC group leader 
reported directly to the PEO M&R.  The PEO M&R kept the 
unnecessary bureaucratic activities away from the MKV SOC 
small working group and took care of the daily 
administrative duties.  (Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 Oct 2000) 
The PEO M&R had great confidence in the group leader to 
keep the MKV SOC project moving in the right direction. 
The group leader benefited from a short, two-layer chain of 
command.  The Acquisition Executive was extremely helpful 
and supportive of the project and was empowered with the 
ultimate authority concerning the MKV SOC project.  It was 
extremely rare that the group leader would ever need to go 
above the Acquisition Executive for help on the project. 
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The group leader not only had  support and guidance from 
USSOCOM, but he also enjoyed  support and guidance from 
COMNAVSPECWARCOM.  "The group leader traveled to the West 
Coast [to brief the SEAL admiral] every two months." 
(Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 Oct 2000)  The group leader kept the 
SEAL admiral appraised of the progress of the MKV SOC 
program and was provided help from NAVSPECWARCOM whenever 
he needed it. 
The group leader volunteered and was personally 
recruited by USSOCOM and the NSW leadership to head the MKV 
SOC project.  The group leader was a highly respected 
member of the NSW community and possessed a great deal of 
knowledge and expertise on NSW small boat operations. 
USSOCOM and NAVSPECWARCOM leadership provided the group 
leader with a clearly defined goal of developing a patrol 
craft, which met the NSW requirements in the shortest time, 
and within budget limitations. (USSOCOM, MKVSOC Standard 
Information Document, p. 2) 
2.  Resources and Funding 
The MKV SOC project was staffed with the right 
personnel, who possessed the required skills to meet the 
goal of the project.  In addition to the key personnel of 
the small working group, the group enjoyed support from 
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eighteen contractors as well as support, from the technical 
support team, operator support from the Fleet Introduction 
Team, USSOCOM staff directorate support, and other agencies 
and commands.  Although the actual MKV SOC working group 
was small, it had access to any expertise it required to 
complete the project successfully. 
The group was given the time needed and was allowed to 
focus on completing its tasks.  The group used an 
innovative streamlined acquisition process to shorten the 
length of time needed to complete the project.  All 
developmental and production testing was completed ahead of 
schedule and all production milestones were on time or 
ahead of schedule. 
The group was given the appropriate amount of funding 
to complete its tasks.  Funding was transferred to the 
companies, who were competing for the MKV SOC contract, on 
time and without problems. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 OCT 2000) 
The funding for the program was made available from 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds 
for the first two years of the project.  The following 
years the funds came directly from the command's Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) and were funded directly from 
the USSOCOM budget.  (The POM is the routine process by 
which a project is funded in the Department of Defense.) 
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The small working group was given the funding it needed, 
but the group leader challenged the status quo and found 
ways to save money.  For example, the original cost 
estimate for the developmental testing of the MKV SOC was 
five million dollars.  The group leader challenged that 
dollar figure, conducted the tests in Key West, Florida and 
Eglin AFB, Florida and it cost only five hundred thousand 
dollars to test the craft, saving $4.5 million. 
3. Autonomy 
The MKV SOC small working group was given autonomy 
from USSOCOM to focus completely on its goal of developing 
a medium range patrol craft.  The group leader was allowed 
to separate the group from the daily routine at USSOCOM. 
The group leader moved the group into an old barracks; away 
from the USSOCOM headquarters to better help the group 
focus on its mission.  The group enjoyed a workspace of its 
own, and worked virtually uninterrupted.  The group leader 
only reported to his boss when he needed help with 
problems.  The group leader was never micromanaged by 
USSOCOM.  The group was allowed to change the acquisition 
cycle and streamline the process.  The group leader was 
also able to receive approval and funding for a complete 
logistics package that included trucks, trailers and spare 
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parts, so the first operational MKV SOC detachment and all 
future detachments would have the complete package required 
for an operational deployment.  The group leader was given 
the autonomy by the Acquisition Executive to make this 
happen. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 2 6 October 2000) 
4.  Ownership 
The NSW leadership understood the MKV SOC project, 
recognized its value and assisted its implementation.  They 
took ownership of the MKV SOC project from the beginning. 
It was recognized throughout the NSW community that a 
medium range patrol craft was badly needed.  The group 
leader worked very hard to keep NAVSPECWARCOM informed so 
they felt as if they were part of the project.  The Fleet 
Introduction Team (FIT), which consisted of SBU operators 
whose job it was to ensure the craft had a smooth 
transition from SOCOM to the Special Boat Units, took 
ownership of the project immediately.  The SBU operators 
looked at the MKV SOC as their craft and made 
recommendations on how to improve craft performance and 
capabilities.  The FIT team concept allowed the first MKV 
SOC system packages to be delivered with trained crews, 
complete deployment and spare parts packages and in a fully 
operational ready status. 
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Members of the NSW community were integrated into 
specification reviews, design reviews, construction 
monitoring, developmental and operational testing, progress 
reviews, integrated logistics support development, 
configuration control and system delivery process and 
planning.  The small working group made it a point to deal 
with NSW operators who could positively influence the final 
product and had a vested interest in the success of the 
program.  Including the operators in this way, who were the 
end users of the craft, from the start of the project 
ensured that the NSW community took ownership of the 
project. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 2 6 OCTOBER 2 000)  This would 
help the MKV SOCs during the implementation process and 
ensured the entire NSW community accepted them.  A final 
indicator that the NSW leadership took ownership of the MKV 
SOC project was that training manual were written, 
exercises conducted and doctrine established to validate 
the MKV SOC program. 
5.  License to Fail 
The MKV SOC small working group had a license to fail 
from USSOCOM.  During a telephone conversation with a MKV 
SOC small working group member, he said that no member of 
the group was in fear of losing a promotion if the group 
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failed to produce the MKV SOC platform that would meet the 
operational requirements.  No failures or setbacks caused 
the group to be in jeopardy of being dissolved.  The group 
could fail without fear of retaliation from the USSOCOM 
leadership or the rest of the organization.  The group was 
very confident and understood it had the potential to 
produce a great, innovative system that would benefit the 
NSW community and enhance its operational capabilities. 
Failure was not on the minds of the group members.  The 
most critical event of the MKV SOC project was loading the 
MKV SOC on a C-5 and then air deploying the system. 
(Freeman, 2 6 OCTOBER 2 000)  In order for the project to be 
successful and meet the Operational Requirements Document 
of COMNAVSPECWARCOM, the MKV SOCs had to fit inside a C-5 
aircraft.  Had this failed, this would have been a setback 
for the program.  The group was confident and they had no 
fear of failure or its repercussions. 
C.  SUMMARY 
The MKV SOC project was a success by every measure. 
All five key variables were present: support and guidance 
of the leadership, resources and funding, autonomy, 
ownership, and the license to fail, while the small working 
group labored to develop a unique, innovative insertion and 
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extraction platform.  The project received a very high 
level of priority from the top leadership at USSOCOM and 
NAVSPECWARCOM.  Due to the project being taken from 
NAVSEA's control, and being the first in-house acquisition 
project at USSOCOM the success of the project was a major 
priority of the leadership at USSOCOM.  They realized that 
the success of the MKV project would have future 
ramifications on the prestige of USSOCOM and its 
acquisition process.  USSOCOM understood that NSW needed a 
medium range patrol craft.  Lack of one was a serious 
shortfall that adversely affected operational readiness. 
USSOCOM took the project from NAVSEA because it believed 
that it could produce a patrol craft in less than the seven 
years required by NAVSEA.  NSW understood it badly needed a 
new patrol craft to insert and extract SEALs from a target 
on a craft that provided a reliable, safe, operator 
friendly and relatively comfortable platform. 
NSW operators were involved with the project from the 
beginning of the acquisition process.  The Fleet 
Introduction Team was made up of SBU operators.  They made 
continuous recommendations for improvements and identified 
problems during the entire project.  The SBU operators 
involved in the MKV SOC project returned to the Special 
Boat Units excited about the capabilities of the MKV SOCs. 
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Many of the most qualified SBU operators wanted to be 
involved with the MKV SOC project.  The license to fail 
variable was the weakest of the five variables.  After 
interviewing a MKV SOC small working group member, I 
believe it was present, but it was never positively tested. 
The group was so confident during the project that failure 
never entered their minds.  There was not an event that was 
a critical failure that seriously threatened the project. 
The MKV SOC small working group not only produced an 
innovative new craft for the NSW inventory, but it produced 
innovative processes such as acquisition streamlining, and 
end user participation.  The MKV SOC project was a 




Resources Autonomy Ownership License to 
Fail 
LDS NSW SWG 
Quantum 
Leap X X X X X X X 
MK V 
SOC X X X X X X X 
Table 2.  Quantum Leap/MKV SOC Variables 
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V.   VISION 2000 CASE STUDY 
A. BACKGROUND 
During the early 1990s, the East Coast SEAL Teams 
encountered difficulties finding qualified SEAL 0-4s to 
accept command of a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Task Unit 
(one SEAL platoon, one Special Boat detachment) attached to 
the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG).  Qualified 
SEAL officers steered clear of the MARG Task Unit Commander 
assignment, as there was little career incentive in 
accepting a difficult job and deploying for six months. 
The Task Unit Commander directly supported the Commander, 
Amphibious Task Force, a Navy Captain who commanded the 
three ship MARG.  Also, on board was a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit that consisted of approximately two thousand marines 
commanded by the Commander, Landing Force, who was a Marine 
Colonel. 
Deployments with the MARG were perceived as extremely 
frustrating and often boring.   It was extremely difficult 
to train while onboard Navy ships and this had an adverse 
effect on SEAL operational skills.  Arguably, the NSW 
forces assigned to the MARG were the best-trained and 
equipped forces present, but the NSW Task Unit was losing 
most battles in the political arena with the fleet navy and 
the marines.  NSW operators were excluded from operations 
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where they felt their involvement would greatly enhance 
mission success.  Lack of training and being excluded from 
real world operations was extremely frustrating to the 
SEALs attached to the MARG. 
Another problem that the East Coast SEAL Teams faced 
was a very high percentage of time each person stationed at 
a SEAL Team was deployed away from his family (i.e., 
perstempo).  The perstempo was 55%.  This meant that the 
average SEAL operator was deployed approximately 200 days 
out of every year.  This extremely high perstempo adversely 
affected professional development, schooling, and morale. 
There was no time in the SEAL operator's schedule for 
advanced training and schooling. 
Other problems noted were the lack of NSW officers 
forward deployed, and the lack of command unity while 
forward deployed.  The full potential of NSW was not 
realized while on deployment.  The deployed NSW assets 
could not conduct interoperability and sustainment training 
with other deployed NSW assets.  The deployed NSW forces 
were "stove-piped" organizations, which meant they could 
only utilize their limited on-hand or organic assets 
instead of utilizing the full network of NSW assets in 
theater to enhance flexibility.  NSW units supported the 
Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe (COMSOCEUR) 
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and the Commander, Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT).  Two SEAL 
platoons and two Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RIB) 
detachments directly supported COMSOCEUR.  NSW had three 
separate NSW Task Units supporting Sixth Fleet which were 
deployed on the Aircraft Carrier, MARG and a submarine. 
Under this force structure, individual NSW units remained 
stove-piped, which meant the units could not combine assets 
and operate together to enhance mission capabilities and 
flexibility.  Another problem identified by the leadership 
at NSWG-2 was the limited shore duty billets for enlisted 
NSW operators. (Toennies, NSWG-2, p. 2) 
These problems led the Commander, Naval Special 
Warfare Group TWO (NSWG-2), located in Little Creek, VA to 
form an Executive Steering Committee in the fall of 1994. 
The commander appointed himself as the group leader of the 
Executive Steering Committee.  This small working group 
consisted of a SEAL commander, Chief Staff Officer of NSWG- 
2 and the commanding officers of: the three SEAL Teams, the 
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team, and the three overseas NSW 
units.  The small working group consisted of nine members 
formed to develop a strategic plan for NSWG-2. 
The Executive Steering Committee developed a bold, 
innovative plan for NSW named "Vision 2000".  The primary 
goal of Vision 2000 was to, "Provide the most capable 
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warfighting organization possible to each combatant 
commander."  (Toennies, NSWG-2, p. 1)  Vision 2000's goal 
was to provide joint and fleet commanders from each region 
of the world the most flexible force package of NSW assets. 
In order to achieve the primary goal of Vision 2000, 
supporting goals and principles were developed.  The 
Executive Steering Committee wanted to improve the 
following areas:  1) unity of command at SEAL Teams and 
overseas NSW units; 2) SEAL commanders' focus on 
warfighting; 3) optimization of force structure; 4) 
efficiency of training; 5) combat service support and 
maintenance; and 6) integration of NSW forces. (Toennies, 
NSWG-2, p. 1) 
The Executive Steering Committee developed the Vision 
2 000 concept to help NSW improve the structure of its 
organization to meet the challenges of the future.  The 
cornerstone of the Vision 2000 concept created a Naval 
Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) with a SEAL 0-6 in 
charge to provide a single SEAL officer who would be in 
charge of all NSW forces in Europe.  The NSWTG Commander 
would be an operational commander whose focus was on 
warfighting and he provided both COMSOCEUR and COMSIXTHFLT, 
a single NSW commander to call when NSW forces were 
required for real world operations.  The NSWTG Commander 
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would have the authority to pull together NSW forces from 
around the European Theater to enhance the combat 
effectiveness of the NSW forces. 
This authority to command and control all NSW forces 
in Europe would solve the problem of the deployed NSW 
forces being inflexible, stove-piped organizations.  Having 
an 0-6 forward would increase the flexibility of the NSW 
force package and allow the best mix of NSW forces to 
deploy in support of contingencies and real world 
operations.  The NSWTG Commander, as a 0-6 operational 
commander, would be invited to participate during high 
level contingency planning conducted by COMSOCEUR or 
COMSIXTHFLT. 
Another concept of Vision 2000 was to reorganize NSWG- 
2.  Streamlining the current force structure and creating 
an additional SEAL Team was proposed in order to support 
the Vision 2000 plan of command deployments where each 
command would deploy forward as a NSW Task Unit.  Having an 
additional SEAL Team would solve perstempo problems, the 
unity of command issues, and increase time for professional 
development and specialty schools.  A new SEAL training 
command would be created to streamline how the SEAL Teams 
trained.  At the same time, this command would provide more 
shore duty billets for enlisted SEAL operators. 
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Two operational deployment cycles were conducted with 
a SEAL 0-6 as the NSWTG Commander.  The deployments were 
highly successful.  The NSWTG planned and executed special 
operations in support of COMSIXTHFLT, conducted 
interoperability with COMSOCEUR, and exercised operational 
control of patrol coastals during the deployment.  The 
NSWTG acted as the executive agent for NSW training and 
readiness and was the COMSIXTHFLT agent for NSW/SOF related 
issues.  COMSIXTHFLT approved and endorsed the NSWTG in 
every aspect and liked the flexibility and enhanced 
operational capabilities provided by the NSWTG. 
The Vision 2000 innovation would have improved the 
operational capabilities of SEAL platoons and Special Boat 
detachments to conduct successful NSW missions.  The Vision 
2000 innovation failed and was not implemented by NSW. 
B.  VARIABLES 
1.  Support and Guidance of the Leadership 
The Executive Steering Committee had the support and 
guidance of the leadership.  The committee was a unique 
small working group due to the fact that the Commander, 
NSWG-2, was also the committee leader.  The commander 
personally selected the members who would make up the small 
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working group.  The committee leader provided the vision 
required for strategic planning.  The immediate superior of 
the committee leader (Commander, NSWG-2) was the Commander 
Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM), who was 
the senior SEAL officer.  Due to his position and rank, the 
committee leader had a direct line of communication with 
his superior.  The SEAL admiral was concerned with the 
costs of Vision 2000.  He set the boundaries for the 
program.  Vision 2 000 could not require more funding or 
personnel, must be approved by the theater commanders, 
preserve the SEAL Team name and could be applied to both 
coasts.  Both COMSOCEUR and COMSIXTHFLT approved the NSWTG 
deployment, as did COMNAVSPECWARCOM.  (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 
November 2000)  The cornerstone of the Vision 2000 concept 
of having a SEAL 0-6 in command of the NSWTG in Europe was 
approved by all the required commanders and moved forward. 
2.  Resources and Funding 
The Executive Steering Committee had access to 
resources and funding required to meet its goals.  Even 
though Vision 2 000 would not receive additional funding, 
the Commander, NSWG-2 had the authority to use the NSWG-2 
budget as he saw fit.  He shifted funds to the Vision 2000 
project ensuring it would not run out of resources.  The 
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committee was staffed with the personnel who had the 
required skills to complete the assigned tasks.  The 
committee leader made it clear that the Vision 2000 project 
was a priority at NSWG-2 and that any member of the 
committee that required assistance would receive it 
immediately. 
The committee was broken down into chairmen for 
particular functional areas such as facilities and training 
requirements.  A member of the committee was allowed 
special access to personnel at NSWG-2 that possessed the 
required knowledge and expertise.  For example, the 
facilities chairman was given special access, without being 
burdened by normal protocol, to the NSWG-2 Civil Engineer 
for detailed questions such as, "How much square footage is 
required for an office space for two people?"  Various 
members of the NSWG-2 staff assisted in answering detailed 
questions, which helped the committee members meet their 
goals. 
The committee was also given the time required to 
complete its tasks.  The goal chairmen met monthly, stayed 
current on relevant issues so the project would not stall 
and reported back to the entire committee.  The committee 
members were extremely busy commanding officers, and still 
found time to commit to the Vision 2000 project.  Due to 
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the fact that the committee members were very busy, the 
time schedule was realistic and allowed members the time to 
be commanding officers as well as productive committee 
members.  (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 Nov 2000)  During an 
interview with the group leader, he said funding was made 
available when committee members required it to meet their 
objectives.  If a committee member needed to travel to help 
the project move forward, funding was always provided. 
3.  Autonomy 
The committee was given autonomy from the rest of the 
NSWG-2 organization.  The committee members were highly 
respected commanding officers so they had autonomy that 
lower ranking, less experienced committee members would not 
have had.  The committee leader was the Commander, NSWG-2. 
By having the NSWG-2 Commander as the committee leader, 
Vision 2000 enjoyed autonomy that many small working groups 
would never have. (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2000) 
The committee leader provided vision to the group and 
allowed the goal chairmen the latitude and autonomy to work 
on their goals without interference from him or the rest of 
the NSWG-2 organization.  During an interview with the 
group leader, he said whenever a chairman had a problem, 
61 
they could go straight to the•committee leader for 
resolution or assistance and they were not required to get 
approval from lower ranking officers at NSWG-2.  By having 
the commander as the committee leader, it kept the chain of 
command flat and kept the rest of the organization from 
interfering with the committee's progress. 
The small working group's leader had final authority 
on all decisions during the Vision 2000 project.  It proved 
to be very beneficial to the committee's progress.  The 
chairmen would meet monthly and the committee as a whole 
would meet once per quarter.  Only meeting once per quarter 
to review progress indicates that the committee enjoyed a 
great deal of autonomy in completing its tasks.  Chairmen 
were free to meet with whomever they needed to exchange 
ideas, brainstorm or share recommendations. (Toennies, 
NSWG-2, 03 November 2 000) 
4.  Ownership 
Initially, key leaders in the NSW community took 
ownership of the Vision 2000 project and helped during the 
initial implementation process.  Two concept deployments 
were made and proved that the Vision 2000 concept was sound 
providing the most capable NSW organization possible to 
each combatant commander.  The deployments proved that 
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having a SEAL 0-6 in command at the NSWTG in the European 
Theater worked.  It was so successful that the Commander, 
Sixth Fleet demanded that the deployments continue. 
(Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2 0 00) 
Just as the Vision 2000 concept was validated, the 
entire leadership at NSWG-2 and the members of the 
Executive Steering Committee changed in the summer of 1996. 
Also, there was a change of command at NAVSPECWARCOM. 
These changes in leadership brought in new leaders who did 
not understand the Vision 2 000 project, who were not 
involved, and did not take ownership of the project.  The 
new Commander of NAVSPECEWARCOM was briefed on the project 
and was a supporter of the project, but it failed to become 
a major priority or focus. (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 
2000) 
There was a change of command at NSWG-2 and the new 
commander had heard of the project and did not approve of 
it.  The new commander was briefed on the Vision 2000 
project.  The new commander asked, "How are we going to 
continue to do this?" (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 Nov 2000)  He 
was concerned that NSWG-2 was wasting valuable time and 
scarce resources on the Vision 2000 project.  The new 
leadership was not involved in the project, did not 
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understand it, never took ownership of it and the project 
languished, lost steam and died. 
5.  License to Fail 
The Executive Steering Committee was given the license 
to fail by the Commander, NSWG-2.  During the interview 
with the group leader of Vision 2000, he said that, no 
member of the group risked not being promoted if the 
committee failed to produce an innovation.  The members 
were not in fear of receiving a bad fitness report if the 
committee failed in its efforts.  The committee was never 
in jeopardy of being dissolved due to a failure.  The 
committee was given the latitude to fail without fear of 
retribution from the rest of the organization.  By having 
the Commander, NSWG-2 as the committee leader, the 
committee enjoyed great latitude to explore and think 
innovatively to benefit the NSW community.  The committee 
leader possessed the final authority and did not have to 
explain failures to anyone else in the community. 
(Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2000) 
C.  SUMMARY 
The Vision 2000 case is a study of when NSW failed to 
innovate.  Initially, the leadership took ownership of the 
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Vision 2000 project.  The project stalled and eventually 
died due to new leadership taking command and not taking 
ownership of the project.  The new leaders did not 
understand the project, were not involved with it and did 
not buy into the project.  Due to changes of command that 
removed all the key leaders that had ownership of the 
project and replaced them with leaders who did not take 
ownership of the project, the project failed.  Vision 2000 
did not fail because of faulty of misguided ideas and 
concepts; it failed because the ownership variable 




Resources Autonomy Ownership License to 
Fail 
LDS NSW SWG 
Quantum 
Leap X X X X X X X 
MK V 
SOC X X X X X X X 
Vision 
2000 X X X X X 
Table 3.  Quantum Leap/MK V SOC/Vision 2000 Variables 
Note:  X's not bolded in table indicates that the author 
believes the variable was present, but difficult to prove. 
65 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
66 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A.  FINDINGS 
This thesis found that the five key variables 
identified by McCaskey and NSW leadership were present when 
small working groups succeeded in stimulating innovation 
within a larger organization.  The case studies confirm the 
importance of having the support and guidance of the 
leadership, access to resources and funding, and autonomy, 
if the small working group is to produce innovation.  The 
small working group must also have the license to fail in 
order to push the envelope and think innovatively without 
fear of failure. 
The license to fail variable was the most difficult to 
prove during the case studies.  Often the group believed 
that they possessed the license to fail, but it did not 
test the leadership of the organization.  In order to 
positively test for its presence, the case studies needed 
to provide major failures or setbacks.  This did not happen 
during the three Naval Special Warfare (NSW) case studies. 
The Vision 2 000 case study failed to produce an innovation, 
but the project did not have any major failures or setbacks 
until it was ended. 
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The three case studies suggest that the ownership 
variable is the most important variable and must be present 
for an innovative project or concept to be implemented. 
The small working groups all took ownership of their 
innovative projects from the beginning.  A new leader is 
not guaranteed to take ownership of an innovative project 
initiated prior to his arrival.  If the NSW community does 
not take ownership of the project, implementation will 
become a major problem.  If the ownership variable 
disappears, then it is only a matter of time until other 
variables disappear and the innovative project comes to an 
abrupt end. 
The case studies display that implementing an 
innovation is the most difficult phase during the 
innovation process.  Innovative projects may cover a four 
to five year period from beginning to end; some projects 
continue for ten years or more.  The three NSW case studies 
covered approximately 5 years or slightly longer. 
A critical point was identified during the evaluation 
of the data collected on the case studies.  This critical 
point was the period of time immediately following a change 
of command or change in leadership.  In the Quantum Leap 
case study this critical point surfaced when a new 
commander took over Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (NSWG- 
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1) , he did not understand the project, was not involved 
with it and did not take ownership of the project and it 
almost died.  In the Vision 2000 case study following a 
change of command at NSWG-2 and most members of the 
Executive Steering Committee, the new leaders did not take 
ownership of the project and the project died. 
When new commanders fail to take ownership of an 
innovative project, other key variables such as support and 
guidance of the leadership and access to resources and 
funding will eventually disappear.  When these variables 
disappear, the project will languish and eventually end. 
Approximately every two years in the military, a command's 
leadership will be replaced at a change of command 
ceremony.  This two-year cycle of command leadership will 
not change.  The changes in leadership within the military 
are a constant.  With that in mind, to keep innovation 
moving leaders must address the critical point following a 
change of command and identify procedures to keep an 
innovation alive and well following a change in leadership. 
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B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The leadership of a command should recognize the value 
of all five variables when a small working group is trying 
to produce an innovation.  It is the responsibility of the 
leadership to ensure that the variables are present within 
the parent organization while the small working group is 
attempting to innovate. 
The commander of the parent organization and the small 
working group leader must work together to ensure that the 
new commander will take ownership of the innovative 
project.  The commander and/or the group leader should 
brief the new commander once he has been identified to take 
command prior to his actual arrival.  In order for the new 
commander to take ownership of the project, he must 
thoroughly understand the project, its purpose, and the 
value of the project.  The new commander should understand 
the beneficial effects the project will have on the NSW 
community.  It would be beneficial to the project to 
involve the new commander actively on the project.  He 
should receive updates on progress, milestones achieved, 
successes and failures and should be encouraged to make 
recommendations concerning the project.  The commander and 
the group leader should push to get the new commander to 
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approve, support and commit to the success of the project. 
The group leader needs to be confident and continue to sell 
the new commander on the merits of the project after he 
takes command. 
It is the responsibility of the commander and group 
leader to ensure that the entire NSW community takes 
ownership of an innovative project.  They should brief 
individual NSW commands as often as possible:  It is much 
easier for the NSW community to take ownership of a project 
when a majority of the community has been briefed on the 
project and they have had a forum to ask questions and make 
recommendations.  With this broader support, the challenge 
of leadership transition may be reduced.  The commander and 
group leader need to get as many NSW personnel involved 
with and actively supporting the project as feasible.  They 
need to have "buy-in" from the 0-4/0-5 level.  It is 
necessary to brief all stakeholders who will be affected by 
the project.  This will limit misinformation and will limit 
the affect that detractors of the project will have on the 
community.  If the commander and group leader accomplish 
most of the above recommendations, it will not guarantee 
that an innovation will be implemented and successful, but 
it will greatly enhance the chances that the innovation 
will survive and be successful in the end. 
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